The 8 September Armistice
announcement and the reaction of the Italian Army in Albania
Federico Salviati
INTRODUCTION
Albania
and the Italian army situation
The
decision to invade Albania was taken by the Italians on 13Th May 1939. All
the operative directories were prepared during a meeting between Mussolini,
General Pariani, Galeazzo Ciano and Francesco Jacomoni. The Italian troops
washed up on the coasts of Albania on the 7Th April. The military forces were made of 22.00 strongs, 64 pieces of
artillery, 125 Tanks, 860 motor vehicles, 1200 motorcycles 5.5000 bicycles and
2.500 horses. Three days after the beginning of the operations, the Italians
had conquered the major tactical target reporting 12 deaths and 81 wounds. The
operation were guided by general Guzzoni.
The
Albanian theater represented, more or less, a successful result for the Italian
government. During his permanence in Albania Ciano depicted the country as
favorably incilined towards the army, describing Rome as the “Albania powerful protector
against its regional rivals”.
After the Greek invasion, nevertheless,
the situation changed radically. The Albanian units, employed in the fighting
activities, turned out to be unreliable and “not that eager” to give their
lives for the Italian cause. It is clear, from the examined sources, that the
Italian government naively thought, that its policy of integration, carried on
during the years of occupation, could generate, among the Albanian population,
a social acceptance of the Italian domination. The Greek operation got a started on the 28Th
of October 1940. Once the the campaign was over, the appeal of the Italian
troops in Albanian was completely marred. The effect of the war on the country
had been far more grave than the Italian government perceived. In spring 1942
the situation progressively worsened till the point of no return. What really
worried the Albanians was the possibility that, with the Italian defeat, the
country could loose the territorial advantages acquired under the Italian domination.
Between 1942 and 1943, the relations between
the Italians and the Albanians grew more and more tense. Italian officials and
collaborators became targets of social and political violence. In June 43 the
social situation burst out and the Italian troops had to face the rising of the
Albanian resistance forces.
Up to this point the rebels and the
communist propaganda had been perceived as a minor problem. Ciano and Jacomoni
believed that, with the defeat of the USSR, the communist movement in Albania
would disappear. In addition the national government succeeded in passing a law
that forbade to the Italian army the arrest for political reasons of an
Albanian citizen, without the permission of the Albanian authority. These
factors allowed the rebellion to thrive and the rebels grew stronger and
stronger, with the worsening of the strategic situation.
The
rebels' activities forced the Italian government to rearrange the disposition
of its troops.
The
“Comando Goruppo Armate Est” (East Group Command) was created. The Command had
under its responsibility the 4 main groups in the south east theater:
-9a
Armata ( the 9Th army) in Albania
-XIV corpo d'armata (the XIV Army Corp)
-(Le truppe mar egeo)Egeo Sea troops
-VI corpo d'armata (The VI Army corp)
The
East Group Command was initially under the command of the General Geloso. In a
second moment the coordination was taken by general Rosi. Our dissertation
hence forth will concentrate mostly on the 9TH Army: the unity dislocated in
Albania. The 8 September, the responsibility of the EGC was reduced solely to
the 9th army. This made the East Group Command a duplicate of the 9th army.
Such action contributed in a great length to stir up the situation since this
operative structure slowed down any reaction that could have been taken swiftly
by the officials in command.
1.1
The 9Th army and the operative situation
The
9Th army was divided in 2 Army Corps and it had at its dependence 2 (the
“Perugia” and the “Brennero”) divisions as reinforcements .
Until the “operation Husky” the
engagement of the Army were dictated by the needs to keep the area secure. The
major orders given to the Troops detached in Albania were similar to the ones
carried on by the divisions in Italy. Mostly they consisted in fighting the
freedom-fighters' infiltrations and the local criminality, while guarding
logistics and tactical resources for the troops fighting in the other theaters.
The
9TH army had to its disposal 118.000 strongs and 12.000 back up units coming
from the Albanian military militia. The
operatives were divided among 280 nuclei scattered in the whole Albanian
territory.
Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza and
Frontier Guards provided for the operational security, while the rest of the
troops was meant to carry on the military tasks.
The
9Th army did not have to its disposal a strong artillery endowment. There was
no real counter-aerial weaponry in Albania as well. Heavy fire power was not a
great concern for the Italian troops since the geography of the territory did
not allow a wide employment of armored vehicles. Most of the military
endowment, however, had been took away in order to be shipped to the Italian
units fighting in North Africa.
Mobility of troops was provided
mostly by the Parma division, some contingents like the Peruggia division were
completely lacking in vehicles and mechanized means.
1.2
The German situation
It
is worth noticing that until the fall of Mussolini (25 July 1943) there was no
significant German military contingent in
Albania. After this event, the strategy of the Italian Supreme Command
was to convince the Germans, in every conceivable way, that the Italian Army
was not a major threat for the Wehrmacht. The Germans, on the other hand, took
advantage of the 45 days, between the fall of Mussolini and the 8 September
armistice announcement, to plan out the penetration of their troops in Albania.
The first measure taken by the
German Commands was to appoint general Lothar Radulic as commander of the 2nd
Armored Army. This German division had the specific task to occupy Dalmazia and
Montenegro, neutralizing the Italian troops in Albania by any necessary mean.
In
August, it has been estimated that 1000 Germans penetrated Albania. The
principal targets of the Germans were:
1) The institution of an “office of liaison”
at the 9Th army command
2)
The occupation of Valona and
Durazzo in order to prevent the allies to get ashore.
3)
The institution in Tirana of
the central German command and the capture of the aviation sites.
Such operations were carried on with
the approval of the Italian command. General Dalmazzo (commander of the 9th
Army) believed the Command in Tirana and the liaison office to be both useful
initiatives and he rerouted the incoming German troops to their Command in
Belgrade. In Auguste the German had taken control of all the principals
strategic targets in Albania. In September the Wehrmacht troops in Albania
amounted to 310.000 strongs. These operatives were under the control of the
German command in Belgrade and the South East Army Group in Salonicco. The
German troops, unlike the Italians, disposed of a great mobility and clear
orders. Their primary objective was to “occupy and control”, being ready to use
the force when the goals could not have been achieved.
1.3
Rebels.
According
to the 9TH arm intelligence the
rebel forces were mostly concentrated in the southern part of the country. The
organization was divided in squads, Ceta (company) and battalions. Generally
speaking, every battalion comprehended roughly 160-200 strongs. Enver Hoxa was
the command in charge of the rebel forces (ENA Albanian National Army).
The central command referred to the
local commands, that in turn gave dispositions to the territorial units in the
regions.
2
General dispositions before the 8 September armistice
Before
we unravel the events that took place consequently the 8 September announcement
of the armistice, it is important to frame the preconditions preceding the
deliver of the news.
Between 6Th and 8Th of April the
supreme command sent 3 important documents that had the purpose to give
instructions to the Italian army, concerning the course of action to follow
after the armistice. Such directories were indeed confused and generic and they
contributed to throw the Italian troops in the sheer chaos.
The
Italian commanders detached in Albania, of course, were not informed about the
ongoing negotiations with the allies.
Anyway, short before the armistice
communication, the operative memo op 44 was emanated. The document gave to the
Albanian command the order to amass the troops along the coast. The permission
to mobilize the troops in the region Durazzo-Tirana-Scutari-Dulcigno was
denied. The Italian government was paranoiac about secrecy. Badoglio thought
that authorizing the mobilization of the main strategic regions would have
given away the news of the armistice. The counter order arrived too late and
the forces in the regions remained bogged down, defenseless towards of the
German troops.
Even if the government knew perfectly the nature of the
situation, in the days immediately before the armistice it continued to
broadcast radio announcements in order to spur the Italians to collaborate with
the Germans, reassuring the troops about the Italian engagement to their allies. Only with the emanation of the memorandum n°1 (destined to the Supreme Commanders
of the Army the Navy and the Aviation) for the first time it was made some
reference to the possibility of hostility generated by the German soldiers. The
memorandum recommended to pay attention of the alley's behavior and to intend
acts of violence not as isolated events but as a systematic actions.
Finally the menorandum n°2 referred
openly to the armistice but it lacked of any instruction about modalities and
time schedules. The memorandum was destined to the commands of the Aegean Sea
and the East Group. The document instructed the commanders to not provoke the
Germans and to assure them of the inoffensive nature of the Italian troops. The
document intimated to not partake to the rebellion since the rebells were to be
considered still as enemies. General Giglioli (Chief of staff of the 9Th Army)
received this memorandum on 8th of September at the 17:00. The order was handed
in, directly by general Ambrosio( Supreme Commander of the Italian Army).
General Giglioli made notice that he memorandum reported the 6Th of September
as the due date for delivering. Seen the inconsistency of the fact he pretended
this to be changed. The date was not changed despite the protests. This
ultimately reviled to be a minor detail. General Giglioli, in fact, never made
it to the East Group Command because of the bad weather. This left the troops
without a written order and without the possibility to confirm the incoming
news of the armistice.
The
secrecy and the paranoiac attitude of the Italian government, anyway, were not
less of a cause for the Albanian operative disaster after the armistice
announcement. After the war, criminal courts of Cusani Palace reported
how Badoglio, speaking about the armistice negotiations, confessed to Ambrosio
that the secrecy required by the situation needed to be preserved and he was
ready to sacrifice 500.000 men in order to lead Italy out of the war. Few days
later the armistice announcement (11Th of September) the King broadcast his
getaway from Rome, without reviling his whereabouts. The same day Ambrosio and
General Roatta spoke to the radio, spurring the
Italian troops to fight the Germans who had to be considered as enemies
of the crown. Badoglio, in turn, delivered a radio message himself, calling the
Italian people to resist and to fight against the oppression of the German
troops, that had to be “defeated by the Italian courage”.
There
is no trace of these messages in the documentation consulted, there is no trace
of the orders of the supreme commands or the Italian declaration of war to the
third reich. The only possible conclusion is that the Albanian troops were left
to their own destiny and in the period between the 8 and 19 September ( the arrest of general Rosi) the Italian
soldiers were meant as doomed and beyond any possibility of salvation.
3
The news of the armistice
Colonel
Albert in his notes
explicitly says that “there was a vague sensation about what the subsequent
event would be”
The 8 September, as we said, general
Giglioli was in Rome and General Rosi had received a communication for an
urgent convocation the day after.
The Germans knew about these
movements and they were convinced that Rosi's convocation was the prelude for a
repatriation of the troops.
The 9Th army, meanwhile, was
preparing to turn the command over from Dalmazzo to General Sogno.
The 8 Septembert at the 9Th Army
Commander, General Dalmazzo, was
among of the first ones to know about the armistice soon after its
communication. The general summoned Ten. Col.
De Matteis and he sent him to the East Group Command to have confirmation about
the news. The the East Group declared they did not have any information. At the
19,45 col. Parini from the war ministry communicated to the 9th army command
that the situation was under control and and the communication was just enemy's
propaganda. Acquired the data, Matteis reached the Albanian ministry of
communication and propaganda to write a press note to deny the armistice.
General Tucci from
the 9th army tried to communicate with the supreme command in Rome. Yet he did
not receive any enlightenment. Around 20 o' clock a radio message from Badogio,
announcing the armistice, reached the troops, along with the communication of
denial of the armistice.
The communication of the armistice,
anyway, was received with the utmost joy by the troops. Everyone thought that
the signing of the armistice meant the end of the war and the return of the
Army to Italy. In all the outposts the soldiers celebrated the news all night
long.
4.1
The communication of the armistice to the East Army Group
At
the East Group Command who first brought the communication of the armistice was
Count Barbaric from the lieutenancy of the royal army.
General Rosi, after he had been communicated of the armistice, tried to reach
the supreme command but without any luck.
Around
22 o' clock Maj Shlubeck and Ten Joss, from the German liaison unit, visited
the East Group Command, asking for clarifications. Rosi said to the German
delegates that he had known about the armistice around 18,00 and he had acquired
confirmation of it around 20 o' clock. The
general affirmed that still he did not have any particular instruction about
operative dispositions to follow but he would comply with the directories of
the supreme command. Generally speaking he did not give any particular
assurance to the Germans.
Rosi,
by doing so, was taking time, since he did not have any precise objective. He
was not intentioned to take any personal initiative, consequently, he thought
his best option would have been to wait and see.
At 00.20 on the 9th of September,
the Supreme Command gave instructions to the East Group. With the order 243202,
the East Group lost the command of the Aegean Sea forces and it was ordered to
take control of all the ports and to hold to any strategic land positions in
Albania. The possibility to cooperate with the Germans was explicitly foreseen
but the Supreme Command allowed to retaliate against any violent provocation.
Meanwhile at the German liaison unit office in Albania, general Gnam of the
Wehrmacht, had been briefed by the Col Joss and the Ten Schlubeck about the
situation.
The general decided that the most urgent think was to take control of the port
of Durazzo forcing the Italian vessels to remain in the harbor.
At the 00.30 general Rosi called the
German unit in order to speak with Maj Schlubeck. Gen Rosi stated his will to
keep the heavy armory while the Germans communicated their need to take control
of the ports in order to grant the security of the theater.
At 10,00 A.M of the 9Th September
general Rosi communicated that the Italian troops would retire from Durazzo
Valona and Cattaro. The Germans did not take the news well, stressing that in
this way the heavy artillery would have fallen under the control of the enemy.
General Rosi repeated that there he was only following the Supreme Command's
instructions and he was not intentioned to give up the heavy armory. Around
18.00 general Bessel (commander of the German liaison unit in Tirana) had come
back from his duties abroad. He demonstrated immediately his concerns both
about the possibility for the Italians to turn against the Germans and the
penetration of the Anglo-Americans in the country. Rosi reassured the Germans
that the Italians did not consider the Germans as enemies, giving his
availability for any Germans' operative need. Bessel and Rosi bargained the
whole night about the dispositions to take in order to face the scenario. The
negotiations were long and tiresome between the Italian and the Germans. In the
morning of the 10Th of September finally the commanders agreed on:
1)
The non hostility of the
Italian troops against the Germans.
2)
Freedom of movement for the
Germans in the Albanian theater.
3)
The delivering of the heavy
weaponry to the Germans in exchange of the promise of a quick repatriation of
the Italians.
The
2 generals signed a common agreement and general Rosi, for a short time, truly
believed that his strategy finally was giving its results. The day after
general Randulic landed in Tirana around 10 o'clock. The general had been
nominated to coordinate the operations in Albania after the armistice
communication.
General
Randulic openly communicated, after his arrive, that he had instructions to
arrest general Rosi. After a difficult discussion it was decided to arrest
general Rosi during his duties at the Command of the East Group.
General
Gnam called the Italian Command to let them know that general Randulic had arrived
and he was intentioned to speak with general Rosi.
The
call was made to make sure that general Rosi was in office.
At 10,30, September the 11th
paratroopers of the SS forces surrounded the venue of the East Group Command.
The whole Command was arrested. At 13 o'clock general Rosi was on an airplane
directed to Belgrade were he was taken in custody as prisoner of war.
The Germans were persuaded that Rosi
had an anti-German attitude. Gen Randulick thought that a strong action was his
best option. In the opinion of the general the Italian army, without its
lieutenancy, would have been more malleable and less prone to resist the German
dispositions.
4.2
Considerations about the general Rosi actions
As
we recalled, until the 8th of September there was no consistent German forces
in Albania, while General Rosi had 6 divisions to his disposal. Being conscious
of the situation, the Germans were actually expecting some resistance from the
Italians. Against their evaluations the Army did not opposed any. Rosi in its relation is
very eager in letting us know how he was completely bereft of any information.
All though, seen his position it is hard to justify so much insecurity. Rosi
chose to negotiate allowing the Germans to enter the country. His plan probably
was to gather the troops and to leave the country at the first occasion.
Zangrandi in
his memories is very harsh on Rosi. He thought the general to be arrogant and
very fond of himself. The judgment he gives of Rosi's strategy is completely
negative.
Softer is the opinion of the Capitan
Tirabbassi who stresses the impossibility Rosi had to act independently and the
difficulty of the position wherein he happened to be.
Concluding: The course of action
taken by general Rosi paralyzed the situation. Time was squandered uselessly. On the other hand the
general was indeed in a difficult position, since a misjudgment of the scenario
could have had heavy consequences on his person. A more firm and secure man
probably would have acted in a better way, saving the lives of thousands of
men. The sin of general Rosi was to believe the promises made by the Germans
who, on the other hand, did everything
they considered as necessary to secure the theater.
5.1
The occurrences of the 9th Army
The
“I” office of the 9th army was the first informed of the armistice, the 8th of
September at 16,30. According to the relation of the ten. col. Angelo De
Matteis, the
office communicated the news to the East
Group Command and to general Dalmazzo. The General, for apparently no reason,
grew confident that the armistice had been signed with the absence of the
Germans.
At 22.00 of the day after, General
Gnam went to pay a visit to the 9th army Command. He asked the Italian troops
to yield all the aviation facilities. General Dalmazzo, against the instruction
attached to the armistice communication, did not refused the proposal promising
that the Italian troops would support the Germans against the rebels. They
agreed that general Ferroni
would go to the German command to study a plan for the Italian deployment on
the field. During September 10th, all day long, the 9th army received news of
violent episodes concerning Italians and Germans contingents in the whole
Albanian territory.
The troops was restless but general Dalmazzo
continued to try to keep thinks calm, presenting the situation to the soldiers
as under control.
In the Morning of the the 11th
September general Dalmazzo found out the news of general Rosi's arrest.
Simultaneously the supreme command in Rome closed any communication with the
9th army.
The day after, general Randulic
communicate to general Dalmazzo he needed to see him at the Dajiti hotel in
Tirana. General Dalmazzo joined the meeting shorty after the communication,
accompanied by the general Tucci and the general Di Lorenzo. Here Randulic
communicated that the East Group Command was taken prisoner and he intended to
give the command to general Dalmazzo. The intention of the Germans was to have
someone to trust for the organization of
the Italian march towards the concentration camps. Dalmazzo refused the offer
declaring that the situation could not allow such solution.
After this answer general Randulic
declared general Dalmazzo and his stuff prisoners of war. Despite the protests
of general Dalmazzo the Germans took control of the situation leaving no doubt
that there would be enmity between the Italian and the Germans there after.
The only hope left for Dalmazzo was
an intervention of the rebels or the allies.
After
his arrest, Dalmazzo ultimately issued the infamous order op.9042. With such
document the general was explicitly asking he dependent groups to disarm.
During the meeting of the Command of the
9th army, such decision was justified by Dalmazzo as a useful sacrifice to buy
the army some time. In fact, ditching a part of the forces would have given the
general enough time to reorganize a resistance.
Major Shlubeck, in his report, gives
us another version of the events, speaking of Dalmazzo as a pliable man, who
more than once had already given signs of surrender to the German Command. The order to disarm the Italian troops was
smoothly executed on the same day.
Dalmazzo was surely hoping for
something to come up before it was to late. In the evening of the 11th of
September the Italians managed to keep the individual armaments but they had to
submit to the will of the Germans. The intention of Dalmazzo was to concentrate
all the forces in the north and then to resist the Germans.
According to the relation of general
Tucci, the
general was preparing a movement towards north- east. This would have created
the premises for a first line of resistance. Some Greek and Albanian rebels
would have supported the Italian movement.
The 13th September Dalmazzo renewed
his complains with the German Command, letting them notice that there was no
official declaration of war between Germany and Italy and for such reason they
could not arrest the Italian command.
The Italian military activity,
despite the efforts of the commanders, did not turn out to be of any
usefulness. The action of the rebels relieved to be dispersive and inefficient,
while the Italians were not able to organize a true action to contrast the
German penetration. From the relation of general Dalmazzo it
is clear that on September the 13th, there was no longer any control on the
German movement in the country and the Italians did not have any actual
military power to renegotiate terms for any subsequent action.
On September the 15th the commanders
of the 9th command were gathered in office and some them definitively decided
to give up to the Germans. The same day the news came that the division
Brennero had joint the Germans upon the promise of repatriation. On September
the 16th Dalmazzo was under the complete control of the Germans.
During the days before these events
Dalmazzo had tried, secretly, to arrange a repatriation with the Major Seymor from
the allied forces.
Ten.
Col. De Matteis tried to contact Major Seymor after September the 16Th but it
is reported by De Matteis
himself that the transport of the Italian troops failed for an excessive of
caution.
The same day Dalmazzo gave the order to gather
the troops. In the early afternoon the
general asked ten. col. Zignani to study a plan to free the command of the
German occupation, in order to give leeway to the commanders. This plan reveled
to be nothing else than a failure.
Most of the Units was marching,
without any armament, to Kruja. The division Brennero was useless and the naval
and the air forces did not dispose of enough fire power. The division Firenze
was useless as well because its commander, general Azzi, was
intentioned to join the Albanian resistance and he had cut any communication.
The command could not count on the support of its troops and at the same time,
as we read in the relation of Zignani,
General Dalmazzo was victim of frequent nervous crisis and unable to lead.
On September 17th Dalmazzo
understood that the 9th army was not able to operate anymore. During the night
of the same day general Dalmazzo received a letter from Tucci who expressed is
concern about the situation of the Command, insisting for the general to leave
the command station. In the evening of the 18th Dalmazzo finally was brought to
Belgrade.
With the deportation of general
Dalmazzo, ultimately, the role of the 9th army in Albania ceased. General Tucci
took the place of Dalmazzo but the army was no longer a danger to the Germans.
5.2
An appraisal of general Dalmazzo orations
Dalmazzo
in his memories justifies his behavior as “plausible”. He
really believed that the armistice was the result of a joint action between the
Italians and the Germans. He furthermore
says that the only possible action to avoid the events following the 8
September would have been to eliminate the Germans liaison units at the firs
opportunity. The ground situation and
the general uncertainty did not leave any possibility for a swift
action.
Just as Rosi did, Dalmazzo tried to take time,
in order to plan a repatriation of the troops. Soon Dalmazzo came to realize
that the German had no intention to bargain the repatriation, leaving the
Italians with no possibility to provide for their own security. Dalmazzo did
not partake to the negotiations with the East Groups. May be this presence
would have granted a clearer impression of the Germans intentions. Maybe
Dalmazzo was not resolute enough or maybe he did not want to sacrifice the lives
of his troops in a useless resistance. In his memories he defends his decision
describing it as the most reasonable. Many anyway accused him to have left the
Italian forces to the sweet mercy of the Germans.
Zignani, for
instance, remembers Dalmazzo as weak and scarcely intuitive. The general surely
misjudged the situation and this mistake cost the lives of many innocent
soldiers.
Maj Shlubeck as well states that the behavior of
Dalmazzo was a useful mean for the German purposes and the Italian troops
brought in themselves the seed of their destruction. Dalmazzo was definitively
not the right men at the right place. His insecurity brought chaos upon the
whole army that, instead of fighting, fell prisoner of the old allay.
Even if Dalmazzo could be justified,
somehow, his actions were misled by
presumption and a lack of certainty and this attitude made him take decisions
that turned out to be catastrophic for the life of over 100.000 soldiers.
6
Conclusions
Soon
after the armistice, the Italian military authority was no longer able to
impose its will among the soldiers. Left to their own, the troops went towards
very different destinies depending on their personal attitude and the decision
taken by the commanders of the dependent groups.
6.1
The “returnees”
Once
given the news of armistice, the idea of the “return” became an obsession to
many.
The
situation, anyway, was not what it seemed. Most of the soldiers fell for the
German propaganda, believing that compliance with the German directories would
have got them back home.
A consistent part of the Italian
troops decided so, to give up their armament upon the promise to be taken home
by the Germans. With no weapons and no orders some of them started a long and
dangerous march towards home.
All the events linked to the Italian
repatriation would deserve another study. Here is sufficient to remind that,
the return was full of adversities. Many died in the attempt to reach the
Italian coasts and may other had an even sadder destiny.
Division “Firenze” after it had been
disarmed, started a long march towards Kruja in order to not fall prisoner of
the Germans. Fortunately the division menage to come back home by leaving the country
individually from the ports of the Albanian coast.
The division Parma, freed by the
Rebels in Dracovitza, fled towards Santi Quaranta. Here they managed to come
back home embarking on a transport to Italy.
Similar destiny underwent the division Puglie.
Complicated instead was the destiny of the
division Brennero. After they had joined the German army, they actually were
repatriated. Once in Italy some of them managed to reach their loved ones, some
others continued the war along side the Salò Republic and some others were
rerouted in Germany as prisoners of war.
6.2Prisoners
of war
Soon
after the communication the Armistice, the Germans assumed a very sympathetic
attitude towards the Italians. Gathered all the troops the attitude changed
completely. The soldiers were concentrated in Poland and in Bulgaria and
eventually rerouted in Germany.
During the concentration the Germans
divided the Italians in two goups: the ones still loyal to Mussolini and the
Badollians. The treatment in stock for the 2 groups was very different. The
first ones were apparently still in duty as soldiers. The second one, instead,
were stripped of they military duties and their military honor. Instead of
being taken back to Italy as promised, they were declared prisoners of war and
kept in concentration camps along side with the enemy soldiers.
6.3
The loyalists
The
German after the armistice tried to recruit as many Italian soldier as
possible. The German command presented to the loyalists the possibility to
leave the Albanian soil and to preserve their armament. Many troops felt the
moral duty to continue the battle along side the old ally. Some other joined
the German army just to seek a better destiny in comparison with the one in
stock for the others.
6.4
Non-combatants
After
the armistice the major part of the Italian troops in Albania refused to resume
the fight. They had clearly the hope to manage to return home somehow.
It has been estimated, very
approximately, that between 1945 and 1946 the Italians repatriated from Albania
were at least 20.00-25.000.
Many lived hidden or on the run.
Their condition was awful most of the time. They were forced to work in farms,
undergoing conditions of semi-slavery and discrimination. Ultimately many
survived and could come back home alive.
6.5
Fighting the axis
Once
it became clear that the Germans were not going to fulfill their promises and
the repatriation was just a big illusion, some units from the Italian troops
decided to join the rebels. The relations between the Albanian resistance and
the Italians was difficult and full of hard feelings.
It took some time for the rebels to
accept the foreign soldiers. Most of the time the Italians had to provide for
themselves and their tactical tasks were limited to logistic support or
isolated missions.
The contribute of the Italian people
to the Albanian liberation, anyway, remains undeniable.
The
contribution of the Italian soldier finally got recognized with the foundation
of the Command of the mountainous troops. Such action constituted integral part
of Italian war of liberation that would end only th 25th April 1945.
6.6
What could have been done for the Italians
Could have anything been done to
avoid the dramatic situation of the Italian army in Albania? Of causer the
answer shall be yes. When it comes to hindsight, anyway, it is far to easy to
spot a better way to manage a situation.
Of cause the Italian command in Albania could have been more firm. Maybe this
would have averted the subsequent imprisonment. The story, all though, is not
made up of “what ifs”. The situation was not the most easy one to face. For
sure responsibilities do not have to be ignored but the more we go down the
chain of command and the more difficult it is to point fingers against a responsible.
Reckless and ungrateful has been the
behavior of the commanders of the Albanian forces. Even more reckless and more ungrateful has been the behavior of the
Italian central government. A military action led by the central government, by
all means, could have been a valid option. Employing the forces in the north
Mediterranean or the unites detached in Italy, such action could have even
brought to the open of another front, shortening the war of several months.
But as we have said, history is not
made of lost chances and it would be a lot wiser to get to now the people and
the reasons of their choices rather than looking for culprits to judge.
It is worth mentioning, even if
briefly, the situation of the Albanian forces in the region.
From 12Th April 1939 Albania became
part of the Italian domain and the Albanian citizens were enlisted in the
Italian army. In 1941, seen the scarce spirit of the Albanians forces, they
were retired form the front line. The Albanian units were organized in 3
different regiments with the name of “Albanian hunters”. Between 1942 and 1943,
reasons of domestic order in Albania imposed to not dismiss the regiments.
After the fall of Mussolini, the Albanian forces tun out to be a strong
instability factor for the Italians. Soon after the fall of the regime, the “Albanian hunters” became vengeful and
hostile, adding uncertainty to an already rather complicated situation.
